In order to overcome the challenges of the security environment as outlined in the 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), and better meet the requirements of the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs), the United States Army is required to provide adaptive and flexible forces. Furthermore, the Joint Force 2020 Concept stipulates that the Army must seek to better integrate its forces with joint and combined forces on a global scale. In order to accomplish the prerogatives of as outlined above, the Army has developed a strategy to regionally align its forces to the GCCs. This paper concurs with the concept for regionally aligning US Army forces, as advanced by multiple proponents and agencies in the Army, but will argue that Army forces can be better allocated based on threat-based planning methodologies. Moreover, this paper will propose that the GCCs and the Army strongly consider the synergy of a combination of Army forces and other joint and inter-organizational resources to enable the success of the combatant commanders. Instead, in the contemporary security environment, the military is faced with an interconnected web of challengers which intend to threaten the national security of the United States, given the opportunity to do so. The challenge for the United States military is how to promptly and effectively focus its cohesive resources to achieve the ends outlined by the President and his subordinate strategic leaders across the federal government.
Regionally Aligned Army Forces -A Strategic Framework
The Department of the Army (HQDA) has developed an overarching way to achieve the ends of United States strategy. The Department of the Army has created a concept to provide trained and ready Army forces to the military geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) in support of their efforts to protect national interests and achieve 2 the national strategic objectives outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy and in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). This concept advanced by HQDA, called
Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF), is intended to support the GCCs with up to jointcapable headquarters and subordinate unit force packages to enable each of the six combatant commanders to shape the environment, mitigate tensions, and deter armed conflict in their area of responsibility (AOR). , and for the Army to be better nested within the framework of the 2010 NSS and subsequent strategic guidance, this paper will frame a response to the Army's concept for regionally aligning its forces by outlining the value of applying the threat-based planning methodologies to the capabilities-based planning methodologies already inherent in the Army's design of the RAF concept. Thus, this paper advocates a relook of how much force should be aligned to each of the GCCs. Additionally, this paper will suggest that the RAF concept should include inter-organizational environment (IOE) enablers, including multi-national partners, in order to more effectively support the GCCs.
The inclusion of IOE enablers is a particularly critical aspect of the United States' strategy to deter aggression by potential adversaries. Not only is leveraging the effect of IOE enablers an inherent aspect of nearly all of the ten primary missions that the United States military has been directed to perform
5
, but in the current fiscally constrained environment, it makes great sense economically to synergistically combine the efforts of the United States government and the efforts of multi-national partners who are willing to be members of a coalition or partnership against a common foe. The 3 success of IOE is manifest in each of the GCC areas of responsibility (AOR) as demonstrated when diplomats, development experts, and military forces work hand-inhand to partner with security officials of indigenous governments to develop their own governmental strategies grounded in human rights and rule of law processes. 6 The Army intends that its concept of regionally aligned forces will "support combatant command and U.S. Government requirements to Prevent, Shape, and Win, while remaining operationally adaptable to respond to global contingencies, if required." 7 For the purposes of addressing the RAF concept, this means that the United States
Army must have trained and ready forces which will cultivate relationships with allied and partner forces before they are necessary in a conflict. Through the coherency built of those relationships, the United States Army, as part of a joint, and likely a combined force, with IOE enablers, will be capable of compelling an adversary not to fight, and as necessary, be decisive victors in military actions in the land domain. 8 Capabilities-based and Threat-based Planning Methodologies
As the Army shifts its operational concept towards the regionally aligned employment of its forces, it has developed a capabilities-based planning approach to support the GCCs and United States Government requirements that "considers changes to policy, and implications of cost, force generation, doctrine, training, manning, equipping, sustaining and readiness." 9 In the Army's efforts to support theater shaping efforts outside of current contingency operations in Afghanistan, and with the recent added burden of significant funding constraints, the capabilities-based planning approach is appropriate to use as it considers a finite resource of Army forces not already apportioned by the global force management implementation guidance (GFMIG). However, in order for the RAF concept to be more effectively implemented before the start of FY 2015, the concept requires additional inputs utilizing threat-based planning so that Army forces can be better allocated to the combatant commanders.
Metaphorically speaking, without the balanced application of both capabilities-based and threat-based planning processes, the Army may be providing forces to one GCC that are not the right fit for the environment, and may result in wasted resources that can be applied to another GCC.
It is important to describe the differences between the force allocation planning models as well as the criterion that military planners consider when describing what type, and how much military force to utilize when solving problems with military force.
Equally important is the recognition that although the capabilities-based and threatbased planning methodologies can theoretically be utilized separately when considering the application of force to military problems, military planners seldom use them independently of one another. There must be an appropriate balance of both planning models when considering the employment of any military force, and that balance pertains as well to the HQDA planning for the RAF concept.
The capabilities-based planning model is used primarily when the United States faces uncertain adversaries, when partners and allies are unreliable, when challenges to its interests are ambiguous, when there may be a great deal of asymmetry between friendly and foe threat capabilities, and when fiduciary requirements impose constraints on the amount and type of force that can be employed. In this planning model, forces are applied against more generic military tasks and purposes than in the application of the threat-based model. When using this construct, forces are applied against conceptual objectives derived of strategic guidance and not necessarily on objectives 5 from threat-based scenarios, because these threat-based scenario objectives may be considered too ambiguous.
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The threat-based planning model is more often used when threats are better known and understood. Understanding of the threat and the adversary's intentions is gained through a persistent combination of intelliegence collection, and surveillance and reconnaissance of the threat forces and facilities. This often times requires a systematic approach of shaping the understanding of the adversary across doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader education, personnel, and facilities (DTLOMPF).
In the case of the United States' preparedness to counter the Soviet Union in the Cold War, almost the entire DTLOMPF of the Army was focused to deter, and defeat as necessary, communist aggression whether that was from Russia or from satellite states which embraced communist ideology.
Likewise, in the contemporary environment there has been a significant shift in the land-based force DTLOMPF. The changes across the DTLOMPF were based on requirements from commanders deployed to combat as they sought to be more States military 'gets-it' when it comes to increasing the understanding of Islamic culture and the persistent threat that operates within the fabric of that culture. Now is certainly the time to continue the focus against the most insidious threat to our national security, and not step away from the lessons that the application of the threat-based model has provided over the past ten years.
The utilization of the threat-based planning model requires significant coordination between the force provider and the force employer for the finite resources which comprise the Army. This is because threat-based planning is intended to dominate known enemy forces and their force generation, doctrine, training, manning, equipping, and sustaining capabilities with a tailored force package that can use a combination of effects at a series of decisive points. Those force packages are employed based on specific threat situations that can be developed by modeling and simulation which incorporate various aspects of the threat.
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The threat-based planning model requires much more of a scientific approach in the selection of forces for allocation to a GCC. Therefore, this approach requires the staff of the force provider, to coordinate the amount, type, and time of the capabilities to be provided to the GCCs. In the Army's case the force provider is likely to be the United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). This coordination generally follows a 7 thorough analysis of the current and developing threat in the GCC's AOR, and resultant capabilities required to overcome the threat.
This analysis of the threat is typically completed by the staff of the force employing command, though certainly there must be buy-in of the force providing command. Analysis of current and projected threats by the GCCs is a combined effort of the GCC staff and the national-level intelligence system which fuses technical surveillance and collection with human reconnaissance. Each GCC's analysis is encapsulated routinely in its capability gap analysis which is submitted in concert with the combatant commander's integrated priority list (IPL).
There are tremendous synergies and efficiencies gained when the force providing staff and the staff of the force employing command cooperatively utilize a combination of capabilities-based and threat-based planning methodologies in order to advocate the most effective application of military force in the GCC's area of responsibility (AOR). While the Army has a robust program to experiment, exercise, and study the proper employment of force in the year 2020, and it has assuredly determined that the RAF concept is the best means to provide forces to the GCCs, in the current fiscally constrained environment, there is still some question about whether the Army will be able to get right the allocation of forces for employment by the GCCs before the beginning of FY 2015. 12 It is precisely because of the combination of clearly defined objectives derived of the national strategic documents, reliable partners and allies gained from the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan, declining resources, and a more comprehensive understanding of the threat after ten plus years of fighting violent extremists, that HQDA 8 must include greater threat-based planning as part of the method for aligning its forces to the GCCs. It would be well worth the effort of the Army staff to more explicitly examine the articulation of the threat from each of the GCCs, as well as the resultant requirements laid out in the consolidated IPL and capability gap analysis as it shapes the RAF concept to be fully operational by FY 2015.
In considering which of the threats are most pressing for the United States to deter, and defeat as required, it is imperative that the Army not shrug off the lessons that it has been afforded over the past decade plus of conflict. Among the morals of the recent past, there are two primary things that should not be ignored. First, Army forces certainly have been, and are continuing to be, challenged by fighting an asymmetric foe in a counter-insrugency environment. This includes the challenge of training an indigenous force to defeat a determined insurgent force, as well as to support the people that the indigenous force represents. The second, and equally important point, is that any military force will be limited in how it can achieve success by itself in stability operations.
Given both of these lessons, the stark realization is that the Army must not walk away from what it has learned while it projects its thinking forward. It must include in its force planning for the RAF concept, a strong consideration of future involvement in savage wars of peace, as a primary facet of any rational calculation of whether, how
much, and what type of force should be employed against an adversary. 13 In general terms as well, this means that the Army must be more intimately involved in collaborating with the GCC staffs about which threats that each of the GCCs understands as the most pressing that would involve the use of military force to resolve. The utilization of United States landpower as a predominant means of compelling any nation, particularly on the continent of Asia, to acquiesce to the will of the United
States is naïve and foolhardy. More likely is the scenario that the United States will be called to intervene in wars when the remainder of America believes that we are at peace. 18 And, if we can get the concept for aligning Army forces to GCCs right, it is likely that indigenous forces, trained and equipped by Army forces, will compel their own local adversaries to acquiesce to the combined will of the indigenous nation, regional allies, and the United States. These types of smaller conflicts will continue to challenge America's military competencies to stabilize a friendly government that requires assistance, and to train its indigenous force, to counter a rising insurgency or provide the indigenous force the capacity to provide for the people of the country as necessary.
Army leaders, and others concerned about the future employment of United The most pressing mission of the United States' armed forces remains to counter terrorism and irregular warfare, but it must balance that task with other critical tasks prescribed in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. Because of this balance, some careful analysis must be conducted to determine how to shape the force that will be employed to accomplish the tasks, and where the threat is most likely to affect the security of the United States, its citizens, and United States allies and partners.
At the onset of operations in Afghanistan, and immediately after the capitulation of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, it was generally accepted that transnational terror groups and violent extremist organizations (VEOs) were hard to understand. The language, cultural methods, and social aspects of the threat were an anathema to even the most well-resourced intelliegence mechanisms of the United States. As a result of the lack of understanding of threat capabilities and methods, commanders at all levels were unable to determine the intent, organization, support network, and communications methods of the adversary. This lack of understanding necessitated an application of capabilitiesbased force planning in order to attempt to achieve decision against the enemy force in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The surge of forces in Iraq and in Afghanistan followed the tenets of capabilitiesbased planning, primarily because the challenges to national interests were ambiguous, and because VEOs and insurgents in both theaters employed significant asymmetric means. The surge of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan was intended to overwhelm adversary capabilities by force. The intended, near-term effect was achieved in both cases as the United States government learned and built capabilities to better understand not only the threat, but the culture of the nations where landpower was employed.
In our interconnected and globalized world, the United States still reigns as the economic powerhouse, supported by the most professional and dominant military force 13 on the earth. As a counter to the dominant position of the United States, there are a series of threats arrayed against not only the nation, but threats to regional order and our allies and partners which are equally daunting.
For the purposes of this paper, the most persistent near-term threat requiring United States landpower be available to deter, and when necessary to defeat it, is not as simple as just one nation, group, or even the combination of multiple groups. Rather, the predominant near-term interest of the United States intelligence community that concerns the employment of landpower is the fluid political environments found in the wake of popular uprisings and in the aftermath of sectarian and civil strife that create the conditions in which extremists can participate in political processes. This in no way discounts the very real threat posed by Iran, North Korea, and the challenges of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, anti-access and area denial capabilities found in the Pacific theater, and space and cyber threats directed against the United States and our allies from various means. However, the role of landpower against these challenges has largely been determined "through the Joint Assignment (Forces For) and Allocation (rotational and emergent sourcing) processes already governed by GFM." 21 The most pressing challenge for effectively allocating Army forces remains in those areas where indigenous governments face significant popular unrest, and their forces find it difficult to adapt to internationally recognized norms with regard to how to treat the people.
VEOs continue to receive instructions and support from al Qaeda and affiliated organizations, despite the losses suffered throughout the past ten plus years of conflict .
Al Qeada has in effect "syndicated its ideology and violence, and seeks to take advantage of the areas of weak governance throughout Africa and the Arabian Peninsula." 22 These VEOs remain committed to destabilizing established regimes, oftentimes using popular dissent as a cover for violent actions. When popular movements topple established governments there is significant risk that VEOs and their accompanying ideology will cause an alteration of partnerships, relationships, and alliances that may be significantly detrimental to the United States and our allies in the region as well. 23 The vulnerability exists as well that a broader support base for VEOs in the Middle East and Africa could mean repeated and continued iterations of transnational attacks in Europe and against the United States. The United States and its allies remain in a persistent fast-moving struggle to provide the resources to stabilize the Middle East, without being perceived as overtly influencing the political process, while the threat continues to evolve, renew itself, and attack in asymmetric ways throughout the region, and potentially into Europe and the United States. 24 In the face of these challenges regarding popular uprisings, VEO opportunisits, predominantly based in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs, the United States military must strike a fine balance between adherence to a national strategy which directs a shift of national focus to the Pacific region, and indications of the threat as articulated by military commanders. The following few paragraphs lay out the indications of the vulnerabilities and mitigations that pertain to the application of landpower with regard to shaping operations, particularly building partner capacity.
As described previously, the concept of regionally aligning Army forces is largely intended to allow the United States military to provide trained and ready forces to the GCCs, and to enhance security cooperation mechanisms for the GCCs, including building partner capacity 25 . The United States has found a certain indispensability in working directly with allies and partners to professionalize their military forces through training and joint military exercises. In turn, the training improves the cultural awareness of United States forces that could not reasonably be gained except through direct contact -that is the keystone of building partner capacity. 26 It is worthy of note that in the most recent publically available capability gap analysis, the United States' European Command (EUCOM) and United States' Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) both indicated a constraint on the commands' abilities to train partner forces due to the lack of forces available in the global force management (GFM) process. To remedy the situation, EUCOM has prioritized BPC as a tenet of its theater strategy, and it is the only command to have submitted the requirement for additional Army forces to enable BPC as part of the annual GCC's submission of integrated priorities to the joint staff. 27 In fact, EUCOM has requested additional landpower in the previous three IPL submissions. SOUTHCOM, on the other hand, indicated that Marine Corps forces were preferred to perform BPC tasks in the AOR. However, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) indicated a vulnerability to effectively respond to emerging contingencies in part due to the lack of land forces in its theater posture, but the command did not specifically request additional forces to mitigate the underlying risk.
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The most incongruent aspect of strategy mismatched to a GCC's threat perception is in United States Pacific Command (PACOM). For three consecutive years, PACOM has not indicated in its IPL submission that it requires Army forces for theater security cooperation. Most recently, BPC was not listed as a priority in the command's submission of their IPL for FY 14-18. Furthermore, Army forces are not indicated as part of a proposed solution or mitigating strategy for any of the command's ten specified capability gaps. 29 The IPL and capability gap analysis for FY14-18
represents the commands' synthesized assessment. These assessments should strongly be considered as part of the HQDA staff's relook at the requirement to provide Army forces to the GCCs. The HQDA staff's part of this challenge is to resource a training environment for the forces that will be allocated to the GCCs in the execution of the RAF concept. The HQDA staff must coordinate with the employing GCC the manner in which the training is resourced so that the employing command recognizes any training gaps as the Army force is introduced into theater as part of the joint force.
In situations that involve largely a military effort for a joint force commander (JFC), the friction once inherent between the military services, has been largely overcome since the application of joint processes directed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. JFCs at the time of Operation Eagle Claw in 1980, and the 1983 Grenada invasion had significant challenges to pull their commands together primarily due to the lack of cooperation between service component chiefs within the unified command structure. 31 As a result of Congressional legislation in 1986, the JFC of today can rely on his staff to apply joint doctrine, to speak a common lexicon, and to use joint procedures -all of which have been initiated and subsequently improved in the 27 years since Congress directed that our military re-make itself.
However, in the contemporary volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment that commanders face today, there is hardly ever just a military solution. JFCs have on their staffs, political advisors, civil affairs specialists, and even IOE teams which may be supplied from Washington in a crisis situation. Finding commonality of purpose, language, and objectives in a unified command, which was largely overcome in the years following Goldwater-Nichols, is now again one of the most pressing challenges of JFCs who work within the framework of an inter-organizational environment.
This IOE challenge to the JFC was apparent to the author in two military exercises of which he was a part. 32 The included an offensive operation at the completion of joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI), followed by a stabilization operation when the aggressor nation was expelled from the nation it had invaded.
In both cases, the command was challenged to integrate IOE considerations in the planning prior to the exercise, and equally challenged to integrate new IOE staff members as part of the boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and work-groups (B2C2WG) process in the execution of the exercise. As a result, the staff of both joint commands planned and executed in a degraded mode which resulted in the commander making decisions without a thorough knowledge of the problem set. Consequently, the JFC and staff had to re-attack critical elements of the problem upon introduction of the IOE team.
Though, the staffs in both cases overcame initial frictions after working intensively with IOE members, the proximate cause of the degradation of the staff's capabilities stemmed from the lack of experience in understanding what capabilities the IOE partners could provide, and not having contact with the IOE partners until a crisis had erupted.
In the most recent exercise, the IOE team did not arrive until well after the design process had concluded and the initial order was already written. As a result, the military staff failed to include pertinent information about the operational environment as part of framing the problem for the commander. When the IOE team was involved in the process, there was additional information that the team provided to the planning effort that a branch plan was eventually executed.
While this vignette focuses on the challenges with regard to IOE synchronization at the JTF and CJFLCC levels, the same challenges will lilely exist at the tactical level as well. This vignette is intended to be instructive to Army leaders in an effort to induce coordination at longer-range intervals to ensure the availability of IOE partners as part of the training effort before Army forces deploy to be utilized in a combatant command AOR.
Recommendations and Conclusion
Initial Congress came to the rescue in 1986, but today the organizational and resourcing problems posed to integrate an inter-organizational team are likely to become pressing concerns that will need to be mitigated by joint force commanders, especially as we refocus much of our efforts towards deterrence in each of the global combatant commands.
To that end, the HQDA staff should resource an inter-organizational training environment that provides Army forces allocated to combatant commanders as regionally aligned forces, an opportunity to learn and grow at home station before deploying into theater. Likewise, in the longer term, a change in policy is required within the DoD for inter-organizational cooperation, with the same type of incentives and goals that were created for jointness, but now encompassing the inter-organizational environment.
The United States Army's initiative to regionally align its forces is an exciting and versatile concept that has provided the Army with a tangible means to remain relevant for the joint force and other inter-organizational partners. We should expect that Army forces will become increasingly engaged in shaping activities as they are requested and employed by the combatant commanders during the maturation of the regionally aligned force concept. Lest we provide forces where they are not absolutely required, now is the time to ensure that we have the staff processes correct to ensure that we effectively allocate Army forces in response to the requirements of the combatant commanders who understand the vulnerabilities and risks associated with their areas of responsibility.
Building partner capacity of indigenous forces from the lowest tactical level through joint task force command levels will benefit not only our partner forces, but the 22 regionally aligned force concept will increase the capability of Army forces and our interorganizational partners as well.
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